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CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AS MYTH AND CEREMONY:  
BAD, BUT NOT FOR GOOD 
ABSTRACT 
Organizations adopt corporate responsibility (CR) policies often ceremonially, meaning that 
policy adoption is not substantive and lacks alignment with actual practice. Prior research in 
institutional theory has largely assumed as static view of adoption and suggests that a 
situation of opacity (i.e. the difficulty or impossibility of evaluation) stabilizes ceremonial 
adoption and thus impedes substantive adoption. This paper offers a dynamic view of 
adoption sequences and re-examines the role of opacity in promoting substantive adoption 
among multiple organizations within a given field or industry. Using a three-state Markov 
chain model, we specify the boundary conditions under which initial opacity paired with a 
change towards transparency (i.e. the relative ease or possibility of evaluation) maximizes the 
overall number of substantive adoptions. Our findings suggest that the institutionalization of 
CR-related policies can be advanced by leaving organizations significant leeway and 
autonomy in their adoption decision. In turn, institutionalization may be hampered by initial 
requests for transparency and organizational accountability. We discuss implications for (1) 
efforts to institutionalize CR as a global governance mechanism and (2) the institutional 
theory concepts of decoupling and (re-)coupling. 
KEYWORDS 
corporate responsibility, decoupling, diffusion, implementation, institutional theory, self-
reinforcing process 
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CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AS MYTH AND CEREMONY:  
BAD, BUT NOT FOR GOOD 
 
The last decade has witnessed the emergence of a plethora of principle-based initiatives, 
certification, reporting and accountability frameworks, and other formalized modes of 
industry self- or co-regulation in the realm of human rights, social rights, and environmental 
protection (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011). Notwithstanding the prevalence and rising 
significance of these corporate responsibility (CR) initiatives, several researchers (e.g. 
Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Behnam & MacLean, 2011) have found that CR polices are 
often implemented superficially to produce a ‘green’ and socially responsible image that does 
not affect organizational core activities (Laufer, 2003). Scholars in institutional theory 
likewise argue that policy-practice decoupling, i.e. the pretended yet unrealized adherence to 
societal expectations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), is particularly pertinent in the realm of CR 
(Boiral, 2007; Jamali, 2010). Whereas institutionalists view decoupling as beneficial to the 
organization as it enhances legitimacy and internal coordination (Brunsson, 1989; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977), from a societal point of view both institutionalists and CR researchers regard 
decoupling as undesirable as exacerbating the organizational embedding and 
institutionalization of CR (Behnam & MacLean, 2011).  
Both CR researchers and institutionalists suggest that opacity (a situation characterized 
by the difficulty or impossibility of evaluation) amounts to an important antecedent of 
decoupling. The central role of opacity in the stabilization of decoupling is typified in Meyer 
and Rowan’s “logic of confidence and good faith” (1977: 357) where constituents abstain 
from evaluation and control, support the ceremonial adoption of a policy, confer legitimacy, 
and thus ensure the stability of the organization. Transparency (referring to the possibility or 
relative ease of evaluation), in turn, is characterized by a situation where evaluators engage in 
5/37 
social control and get to the bottom of the organization’s essence and activities. Transparency 
may thus lead to the disapproval of the organization, threaten its legitimacy and stability, and 
pressure the organization to justify the failure to substantively adopt a CR practice, i.e. to 
carry out an adoption that is characterized by a close alignment between self-presentation and 
actual conduct (Christmann & Taylor, 2006). Thus, transparency may eventually lead to 
accountability, where adopters are urged to “give an account of the rationale of [their] 
behavior to significant others when called upon” (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011: 4). In 
short, both CR researchers and institutional theorists (“transparentists” in the following) 
embrace the virtues of transparency, criticize opacity, and suggest that “raising the bar”, i.e. 
introducing stricter accountability and reporting requirements will advance the organizational 
embedding of CR (Gilbert et al., 2011).  
Yet, notwithstanding the important and enlightening work of transparentists, there is 
tentative evidence that opacity can be constitutive of the institutionalization of CR. For 
instance, several scholars have raised conceptual and empirical attention to the phenomenon 
of coupling processes, and explored the transitory nature of decoupling within organizations 
(Hallett, 2010; Tilcsik, 2010; for an overview see Bromley & Powell, 2012). These studies 
suggest that a decoupled structure is unlikely to maintain its symbolic power without 
organizational consequences (Scott, 2008; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Indeed, a state of opacity 
and merely ‘talking the walk’ (to engage in window-dressing) allows decision-makers to 
experiment with, make sense of, and gradually internalize a novel practice and thus contribute 
to the demise of organizational hypocrisy (Weick, 1995: 183; see also March, 1995: 263). 
Thus, in a situation of opacity, organizations may start off with the practice of decoupling, but 
eventually engage in the practice of tighter coupling (Scott, 2008), for instance, by putting 
considerable effort in the integration of formal policies in actual business structures and 
processes—despite or rather because of a lack of social control and evaluation. In view of 
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that, even the most hypocritical adoption of a CR policy can prove instable and yield long-
term institutional consequences (Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012). Hence, a core 
notion in the opacitist perspective asserts that intransparency and the non-disclosure of 
practice implementation furthers the institutionalization of CR, a predication that is 
diametrically opposed to the writings of transparentists.   
In this paper, we shall argue that both the transparentist and the “opacitist” perspective 
are theoretically incomplete as based on a binary and largely static conception of social 
reality. Specifically, the possibility of sequencing and endogeneity effects, as well as of self-
reinforcing processes (see, e.g., Sydow, Schreyoegg & Koch, 2009), is neglected. As 
elaborated further below, this deficiency poses serious challenges to the development of a 
more robust and comprehensive theorizing of how CR takes effect and persist in 
organizational contexts. More generally, although management scholars have explored post-
adoption dynamics within organizations (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010), as well as inter-
organizational variation in practice implementation (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Lounsbury, 
2001), so far, the institutional theory literature lacks an understanding under which conditions 
policies are realized systematically and effectively across a majority of organizations within a 
given field or industry. As Sydow and his colleagues (2009: 698) argue: “While 
neoinstitutional theory elucidates imprinting and stabilizing processes and, in particular, 
sensitizes us to the relevance of symbolic-normative contexts […], it does not address the 
systemic logic of an escalating underpinning of an action pattern or path.” In line with Sydow 
and his colleagues we posit that extant institutional theory conceptions of the diffusion and 
implementation of CR initiatives would benefit from a dynamic theorization of evaluation and 
adoption, which explicitly takes into account notions of path dependence and self-reinforcing 
processes.  
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Specifically, we seek to enhance our understanding about the contextual circumstances 
under which transparency/opacity advances not only “breadth”, i.e. maximizes the number of 
ceremonial adoptions within an industry, but also “depth”, that is, a majority of organizations 
and organizational members actually conceiving, implementing, and thus ‘living’ and 
substantively adopting the standard. We model adoptions patterns by means of a discrete-
time, discrete-state Markov chain process, a frequently applied modeling technique in 
organization science (e.g., Pentland, Hærem, & Hillison, 2010). Markov chain models allow 
us to compute field-level outcomes based on a random process involving initial adoptions 
states (non-adoption, ceremonial adoption, substantive adoption) and transition probabilities 
for each state at each point in time (Abbott, 1990). By means of the Markov methodology, we 
shall explore the boundary conditions under which the process sequence “initial opacity 
followed by transparency” maximizes the number of substantive adoptions within a given 
field (compared to all other possible process sequences). This approach helps advance greater 
conceptual clarity and a more robust theorizing of institutionalization and self-reinforcing 
processes in the realm of CR (see Vergne & Durand, 2010).  
Our paper’s contribution is twofold. First, our study prompts the rethinking of 
decoupling and “greenwash” as detrimental to the institutionalization of CR as a global 
governance mechanism, as currently conceived in the mainstream CR literature (Aravind & 
Christmann, 2011; Behnam & MacLean, 2011; Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2011). Second, we 
integrate institutional theory (Scott, 2008) and the path dependence concept (Sydow et al., 
2009; Vergne & Durand, 2010) by adopting an explicit proccessual perspective which allows 
to temporally separate theoretical incompatibilities among transparentists and opacitists (see 
Okhuysen & Bonardi, 2011; Poole and van de Ven, 1989). Specifically, by modeling process 
sequences through Markov chains, we elucidate how substantive adopters enforce 
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transparency, what renders decoupling infeasible, creating a path characterized by coupling 
processes and growing number of substantive adoptions (lock-in).  
We structure this paper as follows. Subsequent to this introduction, we review both the 
opacitist and transparentist perspective. Next, we motivate the application of Markov chain 
models, and describe the outcomes of a baseline illustration. We then explore the boundary 
conditions under which specific process patterns of opacity vs. transparency enable the 
growth of substantive adoptions. We furthermore specify the consequences of the variation 
and endogenization of threshold values (points in time where a situation switches from 
opacity to transparency or vice versa). We conclude by discussing implications for the 
decoupling concept and efforts to institutionalize CR as a global governance mechanism.  
TWO IDEAL-TYPE PATHS TO CR: TRANSPARENCY VS. OPACITY 
Which factors explain the attainment of depth, i.e. a rising share of substantive adoptions and 
ensuing institutionalization of CR? Focusing on the pivotal role of social evaluation, there are 
(at least) two answers to this important question. The first response reflects the literature’s 
dominant assumption that realizing depth necessitates a situation of transparency as it coerces 
organizations to abandon policy-practice decoupling, i.e. to “walk the talk’ and align rhetoric 
with action (Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Behnam & MacLean, 2011). The second response 
starts from the opposite conjecture in that it suggests that opacity is a necessary (albeit 
insufficient) condition for substantial adoption. Contrasting transparency with opacity reveals 
the need for a theoretical integration and temporal separation of the two perspectives which 
explicitly considers the procedural nature of adoption (Poole & van de Ven, 1989).  
Transparency 
The observation that CR often proves to be merely window-dressing signals that 
organizations engage in decoupling (Meyer & Rowan; 1977; Weick, 1976). From an 
institutional theory point of view, the decoupling of policy and practice equals ceremonial 
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adoption and represents a strategy of organizations to maintain legitimacy when responding to 
contradictory institutional demands (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Bromley & Powell, 2012). 
Consequently, researchers have paid attention to whether organizations actually implement 
CR policies (Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Boiral, 2007; Jamali, 2010; Long & Discroll, 
2008) and examined the various antecedents and consequences of decoupling (Behnam & 
MacLean, 2011; Christmann & Taylor, 2006). Findings suggest that patterns of widespread 
diffusion of a CR policy cannot be equated with the policy’s embedding in organizational 
activities; For instance, low-entry barriers for adopting policies and lax enforcement 
mechanisms and reporting requirements have been found to encourage shirking and free-
riding (King & Lenox, 2000), and to institutionalize unethical and opportunistic behavior 
within organizations (MacLean & Behnam, 2010). As a consequence, scholars have 
emphasized the need for increased transparency to hold adopters accountable and enforce the 
implementation of CR policies (Behnam & MacLean, 2011).  
The call for transparency constitutes a hallmark of “transparentists”, a set of scholars 
in CR research (Gilbert et al., 2011) and institutional theory (Boiral, 2007) who suggest that 
monitoring and control significantly advances the substantive adoption of CR. Transparentists 
stipulate high entry barriers, strict reporting and accountability requirements, and call for 
sanctions, such as “delisting” in case adopters are non-compliant (Aravind & Christmann, 
2011). They reason that the inspection of actual practice implementation helps promote CR 
and ethical conduct in organizations, reduce the propensity of free riding and adverse 
selection, and thus speed up a CR initiative’s development towards depth (Behnam & 
MacLean, 2011; MacLean & Behnam, 2010). Indeed, in the realm of CR, the assumption that 
both internal and external constituents operate under the “logic of confidence and good faith” 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 357) that allows organizations to persist in a decoupled manner 
seems inapplicable. That is, the proliferation of CR policies is accompanied by evaluation 
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where demands for transparency and accountability render the perpetuation of organizational 
hypocrisy often impossible—very much in contrast to Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) baseline 
assumption of omnipresent “confidence” and “good faith”. Instead, we often discern cynicism 
on part of internal constituents such as employees who are unwilling to engage in 
“Goffmanesque backstage/frontstage activities”, that is, they struggle to fully support 
ceremonial behavior (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 179). Likewise, external constituents such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are skeptical of the genuineness of rhetorical 
commitments, and symbolically sanction decoupling through ‘naming and shaming’ 
campaigns (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). In sum, transparentists reason that in view of 
public scrutiny and rising demands for accountability, decoupling is not a viable long-term 
option for adopters of CR-related policies and hypocritical organizations are inevitably 
pressured towards substantive adoption. It follows that the fastest way towards depth 
predisposes the promotion of transparency, and, where necessary, the expeditious and forceful 
condemnation of ceremonial adoption and decoupling.  
Opacity 
Second, less recognized and consistent than the transparentist perspective, proponents of the 
opacitist perspective argue that low entry barriers, lax reporting requirements, and lacking 
accountability are actually conducive to depth, i.e. the spread of substantive adoptions. For 
instance, at the organizational level of analysis, opacitists link control systems to 
organizational failure, and emphasize that the application of sanctions and control often has 
counterproductive effects on intrinsic motivation and trust in organizational contexts (for an 
overview, see Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Weick (1995: 183) eminently summarizes the 
rationale of “opacitism”:  
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If [the mangers] are forced to walk the talk, this may heighten accountability, but 
it is also likely to heighten caution and inertia and reduce risk taking and 
innovation. This outcome occurs not just because people are scared. It occurs 
because people who are forced to walk the talk prematurely often forgo 
exploration and walk on behalf of words that they barely understand. Because 
things that are poorly understood are things that tend to be seen as uncontrollable, 
they seem like threats rather than opportunities. Innovation shuts down.  
 
Hence, at the organizational level, ceremonial adoption is believed to help adopters to 
understand the need to honor their promises and thoroughly implement CR policies. At the 
field level, a rise of ceremonial adoptions may enhance the stabilization and 
institutionalization of CR as not all norm violations (e.g. lacking implementation or 
hypocritical behavior more generally) become immediately visible (Diekmann, Przepiorka, & 
Rauhut, 2011). This helps a CR-related policy achieve a critical mass of adoptions that brings 
about acceptance, comprehensibility, and taken-for-grantedness of the policy’s very essence 
and objectives. It follows that the fastest way towards depth is to endow organizations with 
freedom and autonomy in the decision whether and when to implement a policy. In other 
words, from the viewpoint of opacitists one must not unconditionally sanction organizations 
for hypocrisy and “greenwashing”. Instead, one is well advised to tolerate decoupling as it 
enables organizations and whole industries to “talk the walk”, i.e. to explore, embrace and 
eventually enact ethical prescriptions (March, 1995; Weick, 1995). Opacitists thus imply that 
decoupling may merely amount to a transitory phenomenon and clarify that a formal adoption 
decision may pave the way towards substantive adoption within an organization, i.e. the 
tighter coupling of policy and actual practice (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2011; 
Hallett, 2010; Scott, 2008; Tilcsik, 2010; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). For the organizational 
level, this notion is evidenced by the concept of “moral entrapment” as developed in a recent 
case study of Haack and colleagues (2012) which analyzed the dissemination of a CR 
initiative in the field of international project finance. The authors find that commercial banks 
that formally adopted a CR policy reacted to civil society criticism by publically promising 
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increased implementation efforts. Hence, by committing themselves to ceremonial adoption 
and a good cause, banks became “morally entrapped” and inevitably moved towards tighter 
coupling. Similarly, Christensen and his colleagues (2011) suggest that “aspirational talk”, i.e. 
the rhetorical pledge to reduce the gap between actual and projected reality, eventually leads 
CR to take deeper roots within organizations. Thus, although organizations may require a 
period of “incubation” until formally adopted practices materialize in activity (Røvik, 2011), 
the interaction with alternative logics in heterogeneous contexts induces tight coupling of 
policy and practice.  
Deficiencies of transparentism and opacitism 
Overall, there is a major problem with the two ideal-type views of how to institutionalize CR. 
Both perspectives argue that either transparency or opacity enhances the likelihood of 
substantive adoption. Hence, if reckoned in isolation, they represent a binary description of 
social reality which assumes a unidirectional and static relationship between the possibility of 
evaluation (transparency/opacity) and type and number of practice adoptions 
(ceremonial/substantive). The possibility that evaluation and adoption are mutually 
constitutive and are subject to self-reinforcing processes is neglected. In our view, the 
inattention to the social dynamics of practice adoption amounts to a major deficiency of both 
the transparentist and opacitist perspective as they leave unexplored the very processes that 
account for variance in institutional outcomes (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2009; Schneiberg & 
Clemens, 2006), and lack insight on how to best promote the institutionalization of CR. 
In this paper, we contend that transparency/opacity can be endogenous to the type and 
number of practice adoption, and vice-versa. That is, a field-wide increase of a certain type of 
adoption may not only increase the likelihood of subsequent adoptions of that type at the level 
of the single organization (the classical notion of isomorphism and bandwagon effects in the 
case of ceremonial adoption), but also affect evaluators’ demands for social control. Changes 
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in evaluation (e.g. a swap from opacity to transparency), in turn, alter the propensity of 
ceremonial and substantive adoption. For instance, in a situation of ubiquitous ceremonial 
adoption (triggered, for instance, by low entry barriers and lacking demands for 
transparency), both substantive and ceremonial adopters are ‘tarred with the same brush’ as 
evaluators are confronted with a situation of opacity and cannot discern differences in 
adoptions. Constituents then generalize (erroneously) from single instances of ceremonial 
adoption to the whole population of adoptions (Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). It 
follows that both ceremonial and substantive adopters loose social approval and are 
discredited in the eyes of constituents. Hence, substantive adopters have an interest to 
differentiate themselves from “laggards”, i.e. the ceremonial adopters, and start enforcing 
transparency, for instance by setting up organizational bodies that monitor compliance with 
CR policies. As a result, und fully in line with the arguments of transparentists, more and 
more organizations are going to switch from ceremonial to substantive adoption, and fuel a 
self-reinforcing process that ultimately leads to the institutionalization of CR. Yet, setting in 
motion this process has been dependent on an initial situation of opacity, as it allowed 
ceremonial adoptions to reach “critical mass” (Barnett & King, 2008). Hence, although 
contradictory when viewed in isolation, both the arguments of transparentist and opacitists are 
valid, a paradox we solve in the temporal dimension by applying a dynamic perspective that 
allows building an internally consistent theory of practice adoption (Poole & van de Ven, 
1989; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  
A recent empirical study lends credence to the conjecture that initial opacity if 
followed by transparency paves, or at least facilitates the way towards depth. Haack and his 
colleagues (2012) suggest that lax requirements, low entry barriers, and a early vote of 
confidence on part of civil society (reflecting a situation of minimized evaluation) eased 
formal adoption and therefore has been largely conducive to the diffusion of a CR policy in 
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the realm of international project finance, the so-called “Equator Principles”. Yet, over time, 
due to civil society criticism of the initiative’s lacking impact, a small but rising number of 
substantive adopters saw threatened the stability and legitimacy of the whole initiative and 
pushed the field of project finance towards greater transparency and accountability. This has 
been achieved, for instance, by establishing a governance body overseeing annual reporting of 
implementation efforts, differentiating between advanced and associated (i.e. less advanced) 
adopters, and involving external stakeholders (e.g. civil society actors) in the formulation of 
strategic change processes.  
In sum, the role of transparency/opacity in promoting substantive adoptions has not 
been adequately theorized in the institutional theory literature as being based on a static and 
one-directional account of causal relationships, not taking into account sequence and 
endogeneity effects. Specifically, we lack an understanding of the boundary conditions under 
which transparency and ensuing ceremonial adoption advances the growth of substantive 
adoptions in a given field, i.e., is constitutive of depth and the institutionalization of CR. We 
explore this question by formally modeling adoption sequences and process outcomes by 
means of a Markov chain model. 
MARKOV CHAIN MODELS AS A THEORY DEVELOPMENT TOOL:  
ASSUMPTIONS, SPECIFICATIONS, AND ILLUSTRATION 
In order to develop a better understanding and develop novel theory on the role of 
transparency vs. opacity in promoting substantive adoption we employ a simple Markov chain 
model (e.g., Pentland et al., 2010). Markov models have proven useful for studying a wide 
range of organizational phenomena, spanning analyses of the contingency of career paths on 
individual-level characteristics (March & March, 1977) to the examination of the variety of 
sequential patterns within organizational routines (Pentland, 2003; Pentland et al., 2010). 
Markov chain models are probabilistic models that allow representing a process as it moves 
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from state to state through time and predicting an end state on the basis of the initial states and 
transition probabilities at each point in time (Abbott, 1990). Hence, given that the current 
state in itself is dependent from the system’s historicity and earlier events that occurred 
somewhat randomly, Markov models are particularly suited to study the dynamics of path-
dependent phenomena (Vergne & Durand, 2010).  
Furthermore, the Markov methodology is particularly apt to tackle two major 
challenges when studying the role of transparency/opacity in adoption processes: First, 
empirically, the depth dimension (how thoroughly or “substantively” is a practice integrated 
within a majority of organizations) is difficult to uncover as it requires the longitudinal and 
careful investigation of both degree and quality of practice implementation, typically in form 
of ethnographic studies at several single case organizations. Clearly, such a detailed 
understanding is difficult to achieve at a field level given ubiquitous time and budget 
constraints in social science research. Also, organizational facades, ceremonial behavior, and 
social desirability biases defy easy measurements because of the incapability and/or 
unwillingness of organizations to disclose information about internal CR efforts. Given these 
impediments, previous studies have focused either on policy diffusion at the field level (e.g., 
Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999) or implementation quality within single organizations (e.g., 
Boiral, 2007; Humphreys & Brown, 2008). Second, conceptually, although there is a growing 
body of theoretical research on (re-) coupling processes (Hallett, 2010; Tilcsik, 2010), we lack 
a comprehensive and fully dynamic conception of theoretically relevant transitions between 
different adoption states.  
Formal modeling based on Markov chains allows for addressing both deficiencies: 
First, given that Markov models create their own ‘virtual’ data and allow computing an 
infinite number of counterfactual scenarios, time and budget requirements are reduced and 
problems of secrecy and distrust do not accrue. Second, Markov models help to uncover how 
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simple adoption patterns scale up towards institutional structures and outcomes, therefore 
offering a viable method for theory development on sequencing and endogeneity effects in the 
institutionalization of CR (see Langley, 1999), in a path-dependent and self-reinforcing 
manner (Vergne & Durand, 2010). 
In the context of our study, we are particularly interested in how the possibility of 
evaluation (transparency/opacity) may affect the extent to which organizations adopt a CR 
practice substantively. We model adoption sequences as a simple, homogenous, and 
stationary Markov process and distinguish between three different organizational states: non-
adoption (state 1), ceremonial adoption (state 2), and substantive adoption (state 3). In each 
period, an organization may or may not move from its current state to another state with a 
given probability. The transition between two states is a stochastic process; the probability 
that an organization moves from, for example, state “non-adoption” to state “substantive 
adoption” is given by	݌ଵଷ; the probability that an organization moves from “non-adoption” to 
“ceremonial adaption” is given by	݌ଵଶ. It follows that the probability of remaining in a state of 
“non-adoption” is defined as ݌ଵଵ ൌ 1 െ ݌ଵଶ െ ݌ଵଷ. For example, if an organization resides in 
the state “non-adoption” and the probability to remain in that state or to move to ceremonial 
adoption amount to 70 and 20 percent, respectively, then, by definition, the probability of 
substantive adoption equals 10 percent. Importantly, if the initial probability state distribution 
is given (e.g., organizations are either non-adopters or ceremonial adopters with equal 
probabilities), a Markov chain model allows computing the corresponding probability state 
distributions for all subsequent periods. Given that the probability of an organization to adopt 
substantively equals the share of substantive adoptions among all adoptions, Markov models 
allow us to infer the overall number of substantive adoptions at each point of time.  
We represent a situation (“evaluation regime” or simply “regime”) of transparency 
through a specific transition matrix which defines the set of all states and all possible 
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transition possibilities. In turn, a regime of opacity is defined by a transition matrix with a 
different set of transitions probabilities. We assume that a regime change occurs between two 
time periods and is captured by a change in the respective transition matrix. Figure 1 provides 
a high-level overview of the three-state Markov chain model we apply in this paper, whereas 
NA stands for “non-adoption”, CA for “ceremonial adoption, and SA for “substantive 
adoption”.  
Figure 1: Illustration Markov Chain Model  
 
The distribution of states after T periods (i.e. the number of periods under the regime of 
transparency) is given by	ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ݔሺ0ሻ்ܲ with the initial distribution of states given by x(0) 
and the transition matrix P. 
 
In our study, the two evaluation regimes transparency and opacity are reflected in the 
transition matrices “T” and “O”. As elaborated above, opacity is characterized by a situation 
where evaluation is relatively difficult, thus rendering decoupling feasible (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). In contrast, transparency is characterized by relative ease in evaluation, turning 
decoupling into a largely illegitimate and improbable activity. Specifically, for the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that in a regime of transparency the probability to moving to state 
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“ceremonial adoption” is zero (i.e., ݌ଵଶ ൌ ݌ଷଶ ൌ 0). Furthermore, because of the risk of social 
disapproval (delegitimation), we assume that the state “ceremonial adoption” is no longer a 
valid choice for organizations (i.e., ݌ଶଶ ൌ 0).  
As an illustration, the following matrices show exemplary transition probabilities for 
the dynamics of adoption under the conditions of either opacity (transition matrix “O”) or 
transparency (transition matrix “T”). Note that these matrices formalize extant assumptions of 
the opacitist and transparentist perspective, respectively (see above).  
ܱ ൌ ൭
0.7 0.2 0.1
0.1 0.7 0.2
0.1 0.2 0.7
൱ 
ܶ ൌ ൭
0.9 0.0 0.1
0.2 0.0 0.8
0.0 0.0 1.0
൱ 
Let us assume that in t=0 the probability that an organization has not yet adopted (neither 
ceremonially nor substantively) a policy amounts to 100 percent, i.e. ݔሺ0ሻ ൌ ሺ1.0	0.0	0.0ሻ. 
The distribution of states in t=1 under the regime of opacity is given by: 
ݔሺ1ሻ ൌ ݔሺ0ሻܱଵ ൌ ሺ1.0 0.0 0. 0ሻ ൭
0.7 0.2 0.1
0.1 0.7 0.2
0.1 0.2 0.7
൱ ൌ ሺ0.7	0.2	0.1ሻ 
After one period (in t=1), the probability that an organization has adopted the practice 
substantively is 10 percent (while the probability for ceremonial adoption is 20 percent and 
the probability of non-adoption is 70 percent). In comparison, in period t=20, the distribution 
is given by the following equation: 
ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ݔሺ0ሻ்ܱ ൌ ሺ1.0 0.0 0. 0ሻ ൭
0.7 0.2 0.1
0.1 0.7 0.2
0.1 0.2 0.7
൱
ଶ଴
ൌ ሺ0.25 0.40 0. 35ሻ 
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In the given equation, the probability that an organization has adopted a CR policy 
substantively is 35 percent (25 percent for non-adoption and the remaining 40 percent for 
ceremonial adoptions). Analogously, the corresponding probabilities under the regime of 
transparency are given by:  
ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ݔሺ0ሻ்ܶ ൌ ሺ1.0 0.0 0. 0ሻ ൭
0.9 0.0 0.1
0.2 0.0 0.8
0.0 0.0 1.0
൱
ଶ଴
ൌ ሺ0.12 0.00 0. 88ሻ 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution (i.e. time on the x-axis) of the distribution of states under the 
condition of transparency (left panel) and opacity (right panel) for the first 20 periods. The 
solid black line reflects the probability of substantive adoption, the gray line the probability of 
non-adoption, and the dotted black line the probability of ceremonial adoption. As stated 
above, probability of substantive adoption after n periods equals the field-level proportion of 
substantive adoptions after n periods. Note that the line of non-adoption naturally decreases 
somewhat steeper in a situation of opacity, because ceremonial adoption represents an 
additional option for organizations. 
Figure 2: State distributions under the regime of transparency vs. opacity  
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In t=0, given our assumption for x(0), the probability of ceremonial and substantive adoption 
equals 0. The probability of non-adoption is decreasing over time; in a situation of 
transparency, organizations always adopt a practice substantively; in the situation of opacity, 
organizations have a higher probability of adopting a practice ceremonially than 
substantively. Under the regime of opacity, the probability distribution of states remains 
unchanged after period t=13. The system resides in equilibrium. In the regime of 
transparency, there are still changes. Ultimately, in a situation of transparency, all 
organizations will adopt the practice substantively. All else equal, given our configuration of 
the transition matrices for transparency and opacity, the probability that a practice is adopted 
substantively is always higher under transparency than opacity. Figure 3 reports the 
probabilities of substantive adoption (y-axis) in a regime of transparency (solid line) vs. a 
regime of opacity (dotted line) for the first 20 periods (x-axis).  
Figure 3: Probability of substantive adoption in a regime of transparency vs. opacity 
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In sum, if transparency and opacity represent stable regimes (i.e. there are no changes 
in transition probabilities over time), opacity represents a barrier to substantive adoption. 
Thus, in order to increase the probability of substantive adoption, one should seek to create 
transparency, a commendation that is very much in line with the gist of arguments of 
transparentists (see above). In the following analyses we extend these illustrative findings by 
exploring whether our results also hold in a situation of regime instability, particularly for 
situations where opacity (and thus the possibility of decoupling) amounts merely to a 
transitory phenomenon.  
FINDINGS  
Consequences of regime instability 
Further above we demonstrated that opacity impedes substantive adoption, thus providing 
support for the position of transparentists. In this section, we are particularly interested in 
exploring the consequences of regime instability, i.e. understanding the implications of a 
change from one regime to another. How does opacity affect substantive adoption if opacity 
changes into a regime of transparency? Formally, the state distribution of such a process is 
given by   
ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ݔሺ0ሻܱோ்ܶିோ 
with R reflecting the number of (initial) periods under a regime of opacity. For the sake of 
completeness, we also examine the case in which early on (i.e. periods 1, 2, 3 … R), 
decoupling is not possible (the first period is characterized by a regime of transparency), 
followed by (t-R) periods in which decoupling is possible (characterized by a regime of 
opacity). ݔሺݐሻ ൌ ݔሺ0ሻܶோ்ܱିோ . Thus, we compare the following four different process 
sequences:  
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Table 1: Possible process sequences 
 Phase 1 (t=1..R) Phase 2: (t=R+1..T) Literature 
Enduring Opacity  
(O/O) 
Opacity Opacity Opacitists, e.g.,  
Weick, 1995 
Enduring 
Transparency (T/T) 
Transparency Transparency Transparentists,  
e.g., Behnam & MacLean, 
2010 
Transitory Opacity 
(O/T) 
Opacity Transparency Unexplored 
Transitory 
Transparency (T/O) 
Transparency Opacity Unexplored 
 
In Figure 4, we display the probability of substantive adoption (y-axis) for the four possible 
process sequences (O/O, T/T, O/T, T/O) for the first 20 periods (x-axis). We set the regime 
change (i.e. a change from opacity and transparency and vice versa) to period R=5.  
Figure 4: Share of substantive adoption for different process sequences  
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transparency (periods following period R), maximizes the probability of substantive adoption 
for the periods t=R to t=20. In other words, if opacity (and thus decoupling) amounts only to a 
transitory phenomenon, initial opacity maximizes substantive adoptions and “outperforms” 
the share of substantive adoptions that would accrue under the other three process sequences.  
Identification of boundary conditions: When does OT do better than TT? 
Obviously, the finding that the process pattern O/T (transitory opacity) maximizes substantive 
adoption is dependent on specific transition probabilities in the transition matrices T and O. In 
order to examine how robust our results are to changing transition probabilities in the 
transparency matrix, we keep constant transition probabilities for the opacity matrix (further 
below we also explore robustness in respect to changes in the opacity matrix). In our example 
above, the transition probabilities under the regime of transparency vs. opacity were given by: 
ܶ ൌ ൭
0.9 0.0 0.1
0.2 0.0 0.8
0.0 0.0 1.0
൱ ܽ݊݀	ܱ ൌ ൭
0.7 0.2 0.1
0.1 0.7 0.2
0.1 0.2 0.7
൱	 	
In the following analysis, we explore all possible configurations of T: 
ܶሺݐଵଷ, ݐଶଷ, ݐଷଷሻ ൌ ൭
1 െ ݐଵଷ 0.0 ݐଵଷ1 െ ݐଶଷ 0.0 ݐଶଷ1 െ ݐଷଷ 0.0 ݐଷଷ
൱ 
Recall that a regime of transparency assumes that ceremonial adoption becomes an 
unattractive ( ݌ଵଶ ൌ ݌ଷଶ ൌ 0ሻ	 and instable state 	ሺ݌ଶଶ ൌ 0ሻ ; therefore, all entries in the 
transition matrix’s center column amount to zero. With this assumption, all possible 
configurations of T can be described by the three variables	ݐଵଷ, ݐଶଷ, and	ݐଷଷ. 
In Figure 5, we report which of the four process sequences (i.e. T/T, O/O, O/T, and 
T/O) result in the highest probability of substantive adoption (averaged over periods t=1 to 
t=20). For each panel (reflecting exemplary values for	ݐଶଷ, 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9), we compute the 
share of substantive adoption for the four different process sequences. Each point in the panel 
reflects a different combination of ݐଵଷ (x-axis) and ݐଷଷ (y-axis). A point is colored black if the 
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sequence T/T outperforms all other sequences; we use dark gray to indicate that the sequence 
O/O leads to the highest share of substantive adoption. White and light gray points indicate 
that the sequence T/O and O/T are optimal, respectively.  
Figure 5: Boundary conditions under which each of the four process sequences         
maximize the share of substantive adoptions 
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medium to low high levels of	ݐଷଷ. In other words, compared to opacity, only if transparency 
increases the probability of abandoning substantive adoptions (which is a rather unrealistic 
scenario), transitory transparency turns into the optimal sequence. 
If we compare the three panels (in Figure 5), we can observe that—although the 
different areas differ in size—the general pattern is fairly stable. Interestingly, even with low 
ݐଶଷ ൌ 0.1, i.e. if ceremonial adopters move to substantive adoption with a probability of only 
10 percent (and there is a 90 percent probability that a ceremonial adopter turns into a non-
adopter), there are still ݐଵଷ/ݐଷଷ	combinations for which transitory opacity maximizes the 
probability for substantive adoption. Overall, Figure 5 helps identifying those transition 
matrices T for which any of the four process pattern is optimal, i.e. maximizes the share of 
substantive adoptions (given a particular transition matrix O). 
 We also tested whether the key finding that under specific ݐଵଷ/ݐଷଷ combinations OT 
maximizes the share of substantive adoptions is indifferent to changes in the opacity matrix 
(in the previous analyses we kept the transition probabilities of the opacity matrix constant). 
To describe the transition matrix O, we need at least six independent variables (compared to 
just three for the transition matrix T). Since the entire solution space grows exponentially in 
the number in the number of independent variables, a comprehensive exploration of all 
possible solutions is difficult. We therefore checked the robustness of our findings by 
choosing a transition matrix T for which the sequence O/T is optimal holding T constant; we 
then created 10,000 random matrixes O and tracked in how many cases the sequence O/T has 
been optimal, when compared to the other three possible process sequences. For the case of O 
being a random matrix, we find that O/T maximizes the probability of substantive adoption 
with a probability of 91 percent. This means that the superiority of O/T holds for a wide range 
of possible opacity matrices. 
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Different switching points and their endogenization 
Our prior analyses have been based on the assumption that for the process sequence O/T and 
T/O a regime switch takes place at R=5 out of 20 periods. In figure 6, we display the average 
probability of substantive adoption (y-axis, averaged over all 20 periods) for different 
switching points, ranging from R=0 to R=20.  
Figure 6: Substantive adoption for different switching points R 
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So far, we modeled the switching point as an exogenous factor. However, in real-life 
dynamics of CR practice adoptions, this switching point can be endogenous to the process 
dynamics themselves, i.e. it depends on the development and distribution of adoptions in a 
given industry. For instance, under the condition of opacity, if too many organizations adopt a 
CR policy ceremonially and at least a few organizations have adopted substantively, we 
would expect that as soon substantive adopters become aware of such differences they have 
an interest to create a regime of transparency, in order to enable constituents to distinguish 
between “true” adopters and mere “free-riders” (Barnett & King, 2008). In order to capture 
the dynamics of such processes, we endogenize the switching point R by defining it as a 
function of the share of substantive adoptions to overall adoptions. 
Assuming an endogenous switching point raises the question how the ratio between all 
adopters and substantive adopters depends on the configuration of the opacity matrix (recall 
that with transparency, ceremonial adoption is not a viable state). Therefore, let us assume 
that the transition matrix O is given by:  
ܱሺ݋ଵଷ, ݋ଶଷሻ ൌ ൭
0.7 1 െ ݋ଵଷ ݋ଵଷ1 െ ݋ଶଷ 0.7 ݋ଶଷ0.1 0.2 0.7
൱ 
In Figure 7, we report the share of substantive adopters (of all adopters) in t=R=5 as a 
function of ݋ଵଷ	ܽ݊݀	݋ଶଷ	(i.e. the probability that non-adopters and ceremonial adopters move 
to substantive adoption). The different lines reflect different values of this share, ranging from 
0.15 to 0.6.  
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Figure 7: Share substantive adopters of all adopters 
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analysis is simply to explore how endogenizing the regime switch may affect our key finding 
that transitory opacity maximizes the share of substantive adoptions.  
Figure 8: Boundary conditions in consideration of an endogenous switch 
  
In sum, endogenizing the switch changes the shapes of the areas for which the four different 
process sequences are optimal, i.e. maximize the share of substantive adoption; however, the 
general pattern, in particular under what conditions transitory opacity (process pattern O/T) is 
optimal, remains by and large unaffected (see Figure 5).  
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address this deficiency by employing an explicit proccessual perspective which allows us to 
build an internally consistent theory of practice adoption and coupling processes in the realm 
of CR (see Poole & van de Ven, 1989). 
Specifically, we theorize the possibility of changes in evaluation regimes. That is, we 
model process sequences that include not only enduring transparency or enduring opacity but 
both transparency and opacity. We identify the boundary conditions (i.e. the set of transition 
probabilities) under which any of the four possible process patterns of transparency and 
opacity (e.g. T/T, O/T, T/O, or O/O) lead to the highest share of substantive adoptions. In this 
paper, we have been particularly interested in identifying conditions under which transitory 
opacity (i.e. the process pattern O/T) promotes substantive adoption. We find that O/T 
enhances substantive adoption for cases combining a relatively low transition probability 
from non-adoption to substantive adoption and a high probability that substantive adoption 
remains stable. In other words, under these conditions transitory opacity maximizes 
substantive adoptions within a given field, that is, the process sequence O/T leads to a higher 
share of substantive adoption than any of the other three process sequences (T/T, T/O, or 
O/O). Importantly, indentified conditions are quite realistic for the realm of CR, given the 
difficulty to instantly translate CR policies into practice (Boiral, 2007), and the impossibility 
to recede from a once established standard of substantive adoption (Christensen et al., 2011). 
Hence, transitory opacity amounts to an important but largely overlooked path to global 
sustainability. In the following, we further outline the paper’s two major theoretical 
contributions. 
In defense of organizational hypocrisy: Bad, but not for good 
We contribute to the broader literature on CR and contemporary efforts to institutionalize CR 
as a means to tackle regulative voids in global governance (Gilbert et al., 2007; Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2007). Our analysis suggests that the dominant (and often implicit) notion that a 
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situation of transparency invariably furthers the cause of global sustainability may be wrong. 
Neither is the opposing view fully correct, i.e. the argument that opacity and the absence of 
sanctions nurture substantive adoption. It is only in the blending of transparentist and opacitist 
views that we reveal a novel and promising path to institutionalize of CR.  
With good cause, both academics and practitioners disapprove of the ceremonial 
adoption of CR and urge organizations to ‘walk the talk’, that is, to quickly promote the 
substantive integration of CR initiatives. By studying adoption patterns in a dynamic 
perspective, however, we gain an enhanced understanding of adoption processes and find that 
under specific boundary conditions the process sequence O/T (initial opacity followed by 
transparency) maximizes the share of substantive adoptions. In contrast, an initially more 
rigorous stance toward accountability and social control slows down or even stalls substantive 
adoption, as evidenced by lower shares of substantive adoption under the process sequence of 
enduring transparency (T/T). Of course, the “lowest common denominator” (Sethi, 2002) is 
conducive to opportunism and adverse selection, and scholars rightly question the merit of 
low entry barriers for industry self-regulation (King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox & Nash, 2003). 
Yet, even the most hypocritical adoption of CR policies might prove instable and yield long-
term institutional consequences, not only because of instability of decoupling within a single 
organization (typified by the notion of “moral entrapment”), but also because of sequence and 
endogeneity effects at the institutional field level. Hence, given that initial opacity and 
unsanctioned decoupling constitute a viable way to global sustainability, both scholars and 
activists should not unconditionally sanction organizations for decoupling, but rather tolerate 
a transformation stage that allows ceremonial adoptions to reach a “critical mass” i.e. a 
switching point that triggers a regime change that ultimately heralds the demise of ceremonial 
adoption. Importantly, our findings suggest that this switching point needs to occur early; 
otherwise the benefits of initial opacity are lost. Overall, having explored the self-reinforcing 
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processes and endogeneity effects in adoption sequences we hope to have contributed to a 
better understanding for the pivotal boundary conditions and mechanisms underlying a 
successful deepening and institutionalization of CR. 
Rethinking evaluation and adoption as mutually constitutive phenomena 
Recent studies have emphasized the need to rethink the assumption that opacity and 
decoupling constitute enduring states and examined the antecedents and consequences of 
coupling processes, i.e. the gradual alignment of structure and actual activity (Christensen et 
al., 2011; Haack et al., 2012; Hallett, 2010; Tilcsik, 2010). This paper contributes to the 
development of the institutional theory concept of decoupling and extant notions of coupling 
and entrapment processes as follows: First, we formalize extant metaphorical theorizing of 
increasing demands for transparency (e.g. “walk the talk”, “raise the bar”) by modeling 
shifting demands as a change in evaluation regimes in a Markov chain process. This approach 
allows us to formalize how a specific evaluation regime (opacity/transparency) affects the 
behavioral disposition of organizations to adopt a policy (non-adoption/ceremonial 
adoption/substantive adoption). Importantly, our study reveals that transitory opacity can 
engender a rise in the share of substantive adoption even if in a regime of transparency the 
probability to move from ceremonial adoption to substantive adoption is very low (e.g. if ݐଶଷ 
= 0.1, see Figure 5). Thus, choosing the path of moral entrapment (which, formally speaking, 
is represented by a high transition probability	ݐଶଷ) constitutes a possible, but not a necessary 
condition to advance the institutionalization of CR.  
Second, we explore the implications of making the timing of a regime change 
contingent on a specific field-level proportion of substantive adoption (or on any other 
switching rule). Given that transition probabilities also depend on the type of evaluation 
(opacity or transparency), adoption and evaluation are mutually constitutive. Therefore, the 
here suggested conceptualization of CR institutionalization resembles a path-dependent 
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process that leads into a self-reinforcing rise in the share of substantive adoptions (lock-in, 
see, e.g., Vergne & Durand, 2010). This process is not driven by moral entrapment (the notion 
that ceremonial adoption is eventually followed by substantive adoption, at the level of a 
single organization) but by changes in the stability of non-adoption and substantive adoption, 
due to a field-level regime change from opacity to transparency. Thus, modeling adoption 
behavior and evaluation as dynamic and mutually constitutive uncovers a path-dependent 
mechanism that goes beyond organizational commitment and entrapment effects and helps 
reconciling the bias towards stasis in extant approaches of decoupling and practice adoption.  
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